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Abstract 
This paper analyses the current budget of the European Union and the relative position of 
the new member states. I argue that the EU budget should be reconsidered, as the union 
has expanded to 27 member states and has become more heterogeneous. The budget prio-
rities should be re-oriented toward growth enhancing spending programs. A simple eco-
nomic growth model illustrates that the EU budget is, at best, neutral with respect to EU- 
-wide long-term growth potential, and may actually hamper growth in the majority of 
member states if the distortionary nature of taxation is taken into account. 
1. Introduction 
The European Union went through a difficult time in 2005. First, voters in Fran-
ce and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty and the EU summit failed to 
approve the new budget outlook for 2007-2013 proposed by the European Commis-
sion. After frantic negotiations and concessions from Germany, Britain and the new 
member states, the outlook was approved in December 2005 and a review of the budget 
was promised in 2008–2009.  
The European Union budget is tiny – about 1 % of the Union’s GNI – com-
pared to national public budgets, which typically consume more than 40 % of a given 
country’s GNI. Still, even this small budget is a legitimate concern for policy makers 
and analysts, as it represents about € 120–150 billion annually, and for poorer coun-
tries transfers from the budget may reach as much as 4 % of their GDP, which is 
a significant amount, especially given such countries’ frail budgetary position.
1
The budgetary discussion has been difficult, which is not that surprising given 
the long list of contentious issues. The EU budget is subject to inter-governmental 
negotiations, and often bargains, so it is more a reflection of political preferences and 
historical compromises than a welfare-maximizing instrument. The enlargement of 
the EU  has  made  this  budgetary  round  more  fragile.  The European U n i on  has t o  
accommodate ten new member countries that joined the EU in 2004 and two more 
entrants – Bulgaria and Romania – that joined in 2007. As all these countries tend to 
be poorer than the existing members (with few exceptions) and tend to have larger 
agricultural sectors, the new EU make-up thus has serious budgetary consequences. 
At the same time, the EU is grappling with its ambitious “Lisbon agenda”, which was 
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launched in 2000 with the goal of creating “the most competitive economy” by 2010. 
These two developments put the two largest EU budgetary programs in the spotlight: 
the Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  and  the Structural  Funds  (SF),  which  to-
gether consume 80 % of the EU budget.  
In this paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive discussion of the EU bud-
get’s outlook and an analysis of its efficiency in achieving the goals set by national 
and Union authorities. The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, we 
briefly discuss the EU budget for the period 2000–2006. In the Section 3, we analyze 
the budgetary data from 2004 – the first year in which the new member states contri-
buted to the budget and drew resources from it. We show that the new members were 
unable to qualify for all the allocated funds, especially in agriculture and the structural 
funds.
Section 4 is devoted to the EU’s budgetary proposal for the 2007–2013 fi-
nancial framework. We analyze to what extent the proposed reshuffling of the EU 
budgetary priorities reflects economic reasons and to what extent it may be sup-
portive of the Lisbon agenda’s goals. We illustrate how the perspective was changed 
in late 2005 to accommodate member states’ concerns and we show that the subse-
quent cuts were disproportionately concentrated in structural operations while agri-
cultural subsidies were left largely intact. 
Section 5 employs a simple growth model to determine the likely effects of 
the EU budget on the economic growth and performance of the EU member states. 
We find that, once the distortionary nature of taxation is taken into account, the EU 
budget increases growth in ten EU-25 member countries and has an insignificant or 
mildly negative impact on the remaining fifteen. If we take the EU-25 as a single 
entity, the EU budget most probably has a negligible effect. The new member states 
are, however, more likely to get a positive stimulus from investment in physical and 
human capital.  
Section  6  is  devoted  to  a brief  analysis  of  the new  financial  framework’s 
impact  on  new  member  states’  budgets  and  we  find  that  the new  framework  for 
2007–2013 maintains their inferior position vis-à-vis the old member countries. We 
also suggest a re-shaping of the EU budget to reflect the new set-up of the Union, 
which now consists of 27 widely income-different countries. In accordance with other 
analyses, we argue that the enlarged Union cannot continue to support the exces-
sively expensive agricultural policy, which brings no tangible economic benefits. 
Also, slashing agricultural spending would allow the EU budget to concentrate on 
programmes with Union-wide effects. The last section concludes the paper and offers 
some tentative recommendations. 
2. EU Budget and Enlargement 
The European budget has been a contentious issue for the member states since 
its conception in 1952 (as a small budget of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, as it was then known). Regardless of the EU’s cherished community spirit, most 
countries have treated the budget as a battle for funds among countries. Thus, the bud-
get reflects more historical than economic forces and, from this perspective, could be 
considered a “historical relic”.
2 In this section, we will discuss the impact of the 2004 
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Eight Central and Eastern European countries and two Mediterranean islands 
became new member states (NMSs) of the European Union in May 2004.
3 In bud-
getary  terms,  their  membership was accommodated  by the Copenhagen E uropean 
Council in 2002. The NMSs were given total commitments of € 41 billion and they 
are expected to contribute € 15 billion to the budget.  
Prior to their entry into the EU, there were many estimates as to the budgetary 
impact of the NMSs’ membership. Some studies, most notably (Kopits, Szekely, 
2002), took a very pessimistic view, estimating that EU membership would worsen 
the budgetary balance in the NMSs by as much as 4.75 % of GDP for the Czech Re-
public, 4 % for Estonia and Hungary, and 3 % for Poland and Slovenia. As noted in 
(Hallet, 2004), their estimates were based on the assumption that all co-financing of 
the EU structural funds’ spending would be new spending by national governments.  
Hallet (2004) reached less negative results for the Polish budget. He estimated 
that the fiscal balance may worsen by approximately 1 % of GDP as a result of EU 
membership, arguing that a substantial part of the EU payments would not benefit 
the government budget but would go straight to the final recipients, often private 
(farmers) or independent from the government (universities). 
Other estimates were more cautious. Backé (2002) estimated the net effect of 
EU membership on the net fiscal balance “over the medium term” as neutral. Besides 
being less aggressive on co-financing, he also assumed lower administration costs 
and quantified the “positive growth effect” of EU membership, which should im-
prove the budgets of the NMSs by 0.5–1.0 % of GDP. 
Even  more  optimistic  are  Hallet  and  Keereman  (2005)  who  argued  that 
the NMSs would gain from membership, partly due to the negotiated “compensation 
scheme”, which directs € 1–1.4 billion to the NMSs in the 2004–2006 period. They 
estimated that the NMSs would gain, on average, 0.9 % of GDP in 2004, 1.5 % of 
GDP in 2005 and 1.6 % of GDP in 2006. The biggest net receiver was Lithuania, 
which may have received 2–2.5 % of GDP in net transfers in 2006.
4 Latvia was 
scheduled to receive a net 2 % of GDP in 2006. The lowest net gains were expected 
in Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic (around 0.5 % of their GDPs). 
These estimates are supported by our analysis of the 2004 data (see Section 3). 
The crucial point in Hallet’s analysis is the interpretation of the co-financing re-
quirements and the so-called “additionality” of the EU budget payments. Using Euro-
pean Commission documents, Hallet argues that additionality requires only limited 
additional spending from the NMSs’ budgets, ranging from 0.1 % of GDP for Cyprus 
to 1 % of GDP for Latvia in 2006. The average co-financing requirement was only 
0.5 % of GDP in both 2005 and 2006. These low requirements (compared to Kopits 
and Szekely) were based on the European Commission interpretation that the additio-
nal requirement relates only to EU funding, not to national co-funding. Thus, the NMSs 
are free to reallocate their spending towards projects not financed by the EU struc-
tural funds and this reallocation may be at the expense of potentially EU-financed 
programs. Given, however, that most NMSs already spend more than 3 % of their 
2 This term was first used by the Sapir report, 2003.  
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4 A part of this reflects the EU’s specific allowance for decommissioning the Ignalia nuclear plant. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        307
GDP on capital formation that is eligible for structural fund and Cohesion Fund fi-
nancing, it should be fairly easy for the NMSs to satisfy the additionality require-
ment. 
It should be stressed that these estimates typically do not quantify the benefits 
that the NMSs and their budgets may gain from EU membership. It is fair to expect 
that membership will have a positive sustained impact on growth and employment in 
the longer run (see Section 4). This, in turn, will be reflected in an endogenous wind-
fall gain in income tax revenue and a decline in social transfers. 
3. The New Member States and the Budget in 2004 
The first year the new member states spent in the EU – i.e. part of 2004, as 
they joined the EU on 1 May – presents an opportunity to analyse the real impact of 
the EU budget on these countries. For this purpose, we compare “appropriations for 
payments” as approved at the EU’s Copenhagen summit in 2002 with the actual 2004 
data as reported in European Commission (2005). The available data show the sums 
that were appropriated in the EU budget for the new member states. The actual spend-
ing will not be known until the end of 2007, when the transfers must be cleared and 
approved by the European Commission. Therefore, the data in the Table 1 do not 
show the final spending, but the maximum amounts that these countries can qualify 
for. Even then, most countries diverged from what the EU budget had envisaged.  
As Table 1 illustrates, the total expected budget for 2004 was not fulfilled, as 
the new member states qualified for less than € 6 billion, while the appropriations 
were € 6.2 billion. The biggest “underachiever” was Hungary, which qualified for only 
€ 700 m instead of the expected € 825 m (85 %). In absolute terms, Poland lost some 
€ 154 m. On the other hand, Lithuania could, if all programs receive approval, spend 
almost € 480 m, some € 57 m or 13 % more than it was supposed to. The Czech Re-
public, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta all came very close to the originally planned sums. 
Figure 1 illustrates the individual countries’ standings vis-à-vis the Copenhagen plan. 
Looking at the structure of the transfers, the new member states received two 
basic categories of budgetary transfers from the EU budget in 2004. Roughly one- 
-half of the total transfers – € 2.7 billion, i.e. 48 % of the total – financed structural 
operations, agricultural transfers and internal policies (such as research and deve-
lopment, consumer protection, etc.). Although the economic ratios for these policies 
vary widely, they are all constant fixtures in the EU budget. The remaining € 3.2 bil-
lion was transferred to the new members through two specific instruments – Pre- 
-Accession Aid and Compensation for New Member States. These programs either 
have been phased out already, or will diminish quickly (compensation fell from 
€ 1.2 billion in 2004 to € 900 m in 2006).  
Therefore, one may argue that the former group of budgetary transfers is more 
important, as it better reflects the countries’ ability to draw money through regular 
processes and this ability will be crucial if a given country is to improve its budgetary 
position vis-à-vis the EU budget. The two parts of Figure 2 thus show the “success 
rate” of the new member countries in the two expenditure categories. It is interesting 
that only Lithuania was able to fill its “quota” of the “structural funds”. Other coun-
tries typically qualified for 95 % of the allocated sum; only Slovenia and Cyprus ma-
naged just 90 % of the allocated resources. As far as compensation is concerned, only 308                                        Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
TABLE 1  EU Budget 2004 Spending in the New Member States: Plan versus Reality  
(EUR millions) 
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Source: (European Commission, 2005) and author’s calculations 
FIGURE 1  Budget Transfers from EU Budget as a Percentage of the Copenhagen Plan 
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Poland and Hungary did not qualify for the whole amount. Lithuania, on the other 
hand, may receive € 60 m more than was planned – a hefty bonus of 37 %. 
Finally, we look at the spending items for which the EU budget money was 
used. As we show later, not all expenditures support economic growth. Moreover, as 
Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2007) argue, the EU funds even fail to support convergence of 
European regions significantly. Some expenditures may, in fact, undermine long-term 
growth by, for example, encouraging interest groups to capture part of government 
spending. Therefore, we divide expenditures into two categories: productive and un-
productive. While the division is arbitrary, we believe it captures the most important 
features of spending. Kneller, Bleany and Gemmel (1999) made a similar distinction in 
their paper, where they classified expenditures with “substantial capital content” as 
productive.
5 Ederveen et al. (2002) argue that EU budget transfers may play a different 
role than promoting economic efficiency (enhancing cultural or environmental values, 
for example), but this view has an obvious deficiency in its vagueness. 
Therefore, we classify the following spending programmes as “productive”: 
all structural operations, i.e. including the Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, from among 
the Internal Policies, we classify spending on training and research and development 
as “productive”. Among the 25 EU members, Portugal seems to be the record holder, 
as it spends 80 % of EU budget transfers on “productive” programs. Among the “old” 
EU-15, Luxembourg uses only 5% of total transfers in productive ways. However, 
Luxembourg is very special, as a full 90 % of its transfers come in administrative 
expenses. Among the more typical members, Austria and Belgium receive only about 
20 % of transfers in the productive category (see Table 2).
The share of productive investment differs widely among the new member 
states (see Figure 3). The highest share – one-third – is recorded for Poland, Slovakia 
FIGURE 2a  “Structural” Transfers from the EU Budget as a Percentage 
of the Copenhagen Plan 
FIGURE 2b  “Compensation” Transfers from the EU Budget as a Percentage 
of the Copenhagen Plan 
      2a                2b 
Source: author 
5 The authors classified spending on public services, defense, education, health, housing and transport as 
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and Hungary. On the other hand, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia spend only about 10 % 
of total EU budget transfers on “productive” investments. On average, the new mem-
ber states tend to spend less on productive investments – only 23 % of total EU bud-
get transfers – than the “old” members.  
We may thus conclude that the new member states failed to use the EU budget 
appropriations fully, but the result is not homogeneous for all countries. Estonia and 
FIGURE 3  Share of Productive Transfers from the EU Budget in New Member States 
(and Portugal) 
Source: author 
TABLE 2  Spending from the EU Budget, selected categories (% of GNI) 
Agriculture  Structural 
Funds 
Internal 
Policies  TOTAL  Total 
Productive 
Belgium  0.38 %  0.12 %  0.26 %  1.72 %  0.31 % 
Czech Republic  0.11 %  0.20 %  0.04 %  1.01 %  0.22 % 
Denmark  0.62 %  0.10 %  0.07 %  0.81 %  0.15 % 
Germany  0.29 %  0.21 %  0.04 %  0.55 %  0.25 % 
Estonia  0.20 %  0.46 %  0.43 %  2.51 %  0.56 % 
Greece  1.70 %  1.72 %  0.11 %  3.54 %  1.81 % 
Spain  0.81 %  1.22 %  0.03 %  2.07 %  1.25 % 
France  0.57 %  0.15 %  0.05 %  0.79 %  0.19 % 
Ireland  1.51 %  0.68 %  0.07 %  2.29 %  0.73 % 
Italy  0.38 %  0.34 %  0.06 %  0.79 %  0.38 % 
Cyprus  0.06 %  0.04 %  0.10 %  1.22 %  0.12 % 
Latvia  0.30 %  0.60 %  0.34 %  2.46 %  0.68 % 
Lithuania  0.28 %  0.54 %  0.66 %  2.79 %  0.60 % 
Luxembourg  0.17 %  0.13 %  0.31 %  4.79 %  0.26 % 
Hungary  0.08 %  0.27 %  0.12 %  0.95 %  0.31 % 
Malta 0.06 %  0.15 %  0.09 %  1.77 %  0.23 % 
Netherlands  0.29 %  0.08 %  0.09 %  0.47 %  0.15 % 
Austria  0.49 %  0.14 %  0.06 %  0.70 %  0.18 % 
Poland  0.16 %  0.44 %  0.09 %  1.42 %  0.48 % 
Portugal  0.63 %  2.63 %  0.07 %  3.34 %  2.68 % 
Slovenia  0.19 %  0.09 %  0.22 %  1.08 %  0.14 % 
Slovakia  0.12 %  0.35 %  0.09 %  1.15 %  0.38 % 
Finland  0.59 %  0.24 %  0.06 %  0.91 %  0.30 % 
Sweden  0.31 %  0.15 %  0.05 %  0.52 %  0.20 % 
UK 0.24 %  0.13 %  0.03 %  0.41 %  0.16 % 
EU 0.42 %  0.34 %  0.05 %  0.89 %  0.38 % 
Source: Allocation of EU Expenditure by Member State, (European Commission, 2005) Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        311
Lithuania received the most, mainly due to their success in attracting “compensation” 
payments  from  the EU  budget.  On  the other  hand,  Hungary  and  Poland  fared 
the worst,  mostly  due  to  their  mediocre  record  in  receiving  “compensation  pay-
ments”. The new member states underperformed in comparison with the old mem-
bers also in the productive investment ratio, as most of the transfers were geared 
either towards agricultural subsidies or towards unspecified “compensation” schemes.  
4. The New Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 
The negotiations of the new financial perspective were complicated by the recent 
enlargement, which has increased the number of countries and also the number of com-
promises  and  potential  horse-trading  required  to  reach  a deal.  The main  contentious 
issues have been the size of the budget (1 % or 1.24 % of EU GDP), the restructuring of 
the budget so as to give more support to the EU’s main economic policy package – 
the Lisbon agenda, the treatment of the new member states, and the future of the United 
Kingdom’s rebate. In December 2005, an amended financial perspective was approved 
by the European Council, which fixed total spending (commitments) in 2007–2013 at 
€ 862  billion  (1.045 %  of  EU  GDP).  The deal  cuts  € 160 billion  from  the original 
Commission proposal, with the cuts (ironically) concentrated in the first heading of 
the budget, i.e. the “sustainable growth” chapter (where a massive € 90 billion was 
shaved from the EC’s budget proposal). We will discuss these issues in this section. 
4.1 The Size of the Budget 
As we noted in the previous section, the EU budget accounts for a small share 
of public expenditures across the EU. While average public expenditures in the EU 
were 48 % of GDP in 2003,
6 the EU’s central budget hovers around 1 % of total EU 
GDP.
7 Indeed, it fell from 1.05 % of GDP in 1992 to 0.98 % in 2003. Nevertheless, 
the budget is criticized as “a historical relic […] inconsistent with the present and fu-
ture state of EU integration” (see the Sapir report, p. 162). The report goes on to 
argue that the EU budget is a means of redistributing funds from one group of citi-
zens to another. As such, it often degenerates to a zero-sum game in which individual 
countries compete to divert as much of the budget as possible to their own benefit, 
disregarding the EU-wide benefits. This is confirmed by our growth analysis in Sec-
tion 5 below, which shows the negligible impact of the EU budget on EU-wide eco-
nomic growth. 
4.2 The Structure of the Framework 2007–2013 
The financial framework proposal submitted by the European Commission to 
the June 2005 Luxembourg summit was rejected at the summit. The falling-out was 
apparently driven by a long-standing British-French conflict over the two most con-
tentious EU budget items: the CAP and the UK’s rebate. Nevertheless, these feuds 
were present during the previous budget negotiations and eventually gave way to 
a compromise. Indeed, the December 2005 summit reached a compromise whereby 
the EU budget was set at 1.045 % of the EU’s GNI level. The financial perspective 
6 See (European Commission, 2004b). 
7 Indeed, the Sapir report argues that the national budgets, which account for 97.5 % of public spending 
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TABLE 3  Financial Framework for 2007-2013, versions from June and December 2005 
(2005 prices, EUR million) 
Version 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total/ 
Average 
VI-2005 58,735 61,875 64,895 67,350 67,795 72,865 75,950 471,465
XII-2005  51,090 52,148 53,330 54,001 54,945 56,384 57,841 379,739
1. Sus-
tainable 
Growth  VI-2006 51,267 52,415 53,616 54,294 55,368 56,876 58,303 382,139
VI-2005 12,105 14,390 16,680 18,965 21,250 23,540 25,825 132,755





Employ.  VI-2006 8,404 9,097 9,754 10,434 11,295 12,153 12,961 74,098
VI-2005 46,630 47,485 48,215 48,385 48,545 49,325 50,125 338,710





Employ.  VI-2006 42,863 43,318 43,862 43,860 44,073 44,723 45,342 308,041
VI-2005 57,180 57,900 58,115 57,980 57,850 57,825 57,805 404,655





Res.  VI-2006 54,985 54,322 53,666 53,035 52,400 51,775 51,161 371,344
VI-2005 43,500 43,673 43,354 43,034 42,714 42,506 42,293 301,074
XII-2005 43,120 42,697 42,279 41,864 41,453 41,047 40,645 293,105
Of which: 
Agricul-
ture VI-2006 43,120 42,697 42,279 41,864 41,453 41,047 40,645 293,105
VI- 2005  2,570 2,935 3,235 3,530 3,835 4,145 4,455 24,705
XII-2005 1,120 1,210 1,310 1,430 1,570 1,720 1,910 10,270
3. Citi-
zenship 
VI-2006 1,199 1,258 1,380 1,503 1,645 1,797 1,988 10,770
VI-2005 11,280 12,115 12,885 13,720 14,495 15,115 15,740 95,350
XII-2005 6,280 6,550 6,830 7,120 7,420 7,740 8,070 50,010
4. Global 
player 
VI-2006 6,199 6,469 6,739 7,009 7,339 7,679 8,029 49,463
VI-2005 3,675 3,815 3,950 4,090 4,225 4,365 4,500 28,620
XII-2005 6,720 6,900 7,050 7,180 7,320 7,450 7,680 50,300
5. Admi-
nistration 
VI-2006 6,633 6,818 6,973 7,111 7,255 7,400 7,610 48,800
VI-2005 0,120 0,060 0,060 0 0 0 0 0,240
XII-2005 0,419 0,191 0,190 0 0 0 0 0,800
6. Com-
pensation 
VI-2006 0,419 0,191 0,190 0 0 0 0 0,800
VI-2005 133,56  138,70  143,14  146,67  150,20  154,32  158,45  1,025,04 
XII-2005 120,60  121,31  122,36  122,75  123,64  125,06  126,65  862,36 
TOTAL
Commit-
ments VI-2006 120,70  121,47  122,56  122,95  124,01  125,53  127,09  864,32 
VI-2005 1,15 %  1,23 %  1,12 %  1,08 %  1,11 %  1,14 %  1,15 %  1,15 % 
XII-2005 1,10 %  1,08 %  1,06 %  1,04 %  1,03 %  1,02 %  1,00 %  1,05 % 
TOTAL in  
% of GNI 
VI-2006 1,10 %  1,08 %  1,07 %  1,04 %  1,03 %  1,02 %  1,01 %  1,05 % 
VI-2005 124,60 136,50 127,70 126,00 132,40 138,40 143,10 928,70
XII-2005 116,65 119,54 111,83 118,00 115,60 119,07 118,62 819,38
TOTAL
Payments 
VI-2006 116,65 119,62 111,99 118,28 115,86 119,41 118,97 820,78
VI-2005 1.07 %  1.21 %  1.00 %  0.93 %  0.98 %  1.02 %  1.04 %  1.04 % 
XII-2005 1.06 %  1.06 %  0.97 %  1.00 %  0.96 %  0.97 %  0.94 %  0.99 % 
TOTAL in  
% of GNI 
VI-2006 1.06 %  1.06 %  0.97 %  1.00 %  0.96 %  0.97 %  0.94 %  1.00 % 
Sources: Towards a New Financial  Perspective 2007–2013, European Commission, June 2005, 
Council of the European Union, document 15915/05, December 2005, 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound 
fiscal management 2006/C139/01, 23 June 2006  
(available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/next_fin_framework_en.htm). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        313
was then little changed in a deal made between the European Parliament, Commis-
sion and Council in June 2006. The winners of the negotiations  were France and 
the CAP. While the “competitiveness” budget was cut by a massive € 59 billion (over 
the 2007–2013 period) and the cohesion funds by a further € 30 billion, agricultural 
spending barely budged, falling by € 8 billion (see Table 3).  
The rejigged budget abolished the current structural funds and merged them into 
the sustainable development objective. The current CAP has been moved to “natural re-
sources management”. The Commission’s original proposal envisaged agricultural spend-
ing falling from 42 % of the EU budget in 2004 to 26 % in 2013. However, the amended 
budget proposal envisages the share of agriculture as being 34 % in 2013. Moreover, 
further funds will be allocated to agriculture through the rural development facility.  
4.3 Competitiveness for Growth and Employment 
This first objective is inspired by the Sapir report and is aimed at promoting 
economic growth. The Commission argues that the main objectives within this ob-
jective (sic) are: a) promoting competitiveness in fully integrated internal markets, 
b) strengthening  European  research  and  technological  development,  c) connecting 
the EU through networks, d) improving the quality of education and training, and 
e) helping European society to manage change with social policy. While these are 
rather vague principles, two aspects stand out. First, the Commission advocates full 
integration of EU markets, i.e. including the hitherto fragmented service sector. Se-
cond, the Commission supports the Lisbon agenda’s goal of 3 % of GDP expenditure 
on research and development by boosting its expenditure on this agenda. However, 
the December 2005 negotiations cut an awesome € 90 billion from this objective, 
the greatest cut among all the objectives in absolute terms. 
4.4 Cohesion for Growth and Employment 
The Commission included three main areas within this objective: a) conver-
gence with a focus on the less developed member states and regions, including “sta-
tistical effect regions”, b) regional competitiveness and employment, and c) Euro-
pean territorial cooperation.  
The Commission proposal brings one fundamental change from the previous 
financial  framework:  the cohesion p olicy  changes  from  being  a time-limited  and 
geographically focused policy to a permanent policy pursuing “balanced territorial 
development”. This was strongly opposed by the new member states, but also by 
the UK and Sweden, which argued that cohesion funds should be allocated exclu-
sively to the poorest member states and should not be allocated on a regional level 
(NUTS II). Furthermore, in the second objective – regional competitiveness – all re-
gions within the EU become eligible, including the richest ones. Indeed, the Com-
mission  estimates  that  about  50 %  of  the total  funding  will  go  to  the EU-15  in 
the 2007–2013  period,  the remaining  half  being  directed  at  the ten  new  members 
from 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania.  
4.5 Preservation and Management of Natural Resources 
This is the second largest spending program in the new financial perspective, 
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objective is earmarked for CAP expenditures, 20 % goes to rural development pro-
grams and the remaining funds are allocated for fishery and, finally, environmental 
purposes.
8 The biggest item, CAP payments, is expected to grow by 1 % annually in 
nominal terms, thus precipitating a slow decline in these payments in real terms and 
also as a share of the EU budget. 
5. The EU Budget and Potential Economic Growth 
In this section we will discuss the impact of the EU budget on the potential 
growth performance of the European Union member countries. For that purpose, we 
will modify a simple overlapping generations growth model, applied by Tanzi and 
Chalk in (Buti et al., 2002) and inspired by Barro (1991) and Mendoza (1997). We 
will  then  apply  the model  results  to  the EU  budget  data  to  assess  the budget’s 
contribution to economic growth in individual countries and in the whole EU. We 
should stress that this exercise ignores the short-term demand effects of EU budget 
transfers, no matter how strong they might be. While we follow a rather standard 
classification  (see,  for  example,  (Kneller,  Bleany,  Gemmel,  1999)),  our  analysis 
makes an unavoidably normative decision as to which expenditures (may) contribute 
to economic growth. Finally, we concentrate on long-term effects, as these will shape 
each country’s performance for years to come. Also, our analysis treats the EU bud-
get as independent from the national budgets. Therefore, we assume that contribu-
tions paid by states require higher taxes to be paid within these states. By the same 
token we treat transfers from the EU budget as “new” spending complementary to 
the national budgets’ outlays. One may argue, however, that national and EU ex-
penditures are rather substitutes. If that was the case, the EU budget would be in-
significant by definition and could be abolished with no effect on economic va-
riables.  
While the Tanzi and Chalk model is very simple, its conclusions were sup-
ported by a more sophisticated analysis by Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2002), 
who empirically explored the effectiveness of the European budget using a panel data 
analysis for 13 countries in the European Union. They show that the structural funds 
are weakly effective for countries with the proper institutional framework. The latter 
result is obtained for a wide range of conditioning variables, such as openness, insti-
tutional quality, corruption and indicators for good governance. Where institutions 
are underdeveloped, the structural funds either do not influence economic growth or 
may even hamper it (see (Ederveen et al., 2002), for a discussion). Our model com-
plements previous models by adding the (negative) impact of taxes used for raising 
necessary funds. 
5.1 The Model 
The model uses a classic production function with capital and labor, where 
capital comes in two forms: private Kt and public KG,t. The production function has 
constant returns to scale with respect to the stock of public and private capital, but 
increasing returns to scale overall.  
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Households maximize their lifetime utility and every worker supplies one unit 
of labor every period. In order to make the model as simple as possible, we assume 
that the labor supply does not depend on taxes and that the saving rate is not in-
fluenced by the interest rate.  
Consumption in the future depends on savings Ztand the rate of return Rt. Op-
timal savings Zt finance both private and public investment in the next period. 
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The government finances its budget by levying a uniform tax rate t on all income 
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where  G G  is the depreciation rate for public capital (we assume a zero depreciation 
rate for private capital Kt).
Firms maximize profit: 
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Capital and labor are paid according to their marginal productivity: 
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As we assume perfect capital markets, in every period savings equal investment: 
11 (1 ) tt t t t zL s t Y B K E                (7) 
And private capital grows with total savings and falls with increasing government 
debt Bt and increasing taxes. So we may formulate a “crowding-out equation” (8): 
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Substituting for private and public capital from equations (4) and (8) allows us to ex-
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Equation (10) allows us to disentangle the effects of government fiscal policy 
on economic growth. While increasing public capital KG,t increases economic growth, 
its financing growth decreases, either through the tax effect or through the debt ef-
fect. The debt effect is straightforward: the higher the debt B, the lower the growth. 
The tax effect has two channels: first, taxes lower growth. But at the same time, 
the higher taxes allow a decrease in debt, i.e. they may encourage growth. However, 
the former tax effect is of a stronger magnitude and dominates the effect of (possibly) 
lower debt. The total effect of government policy depends on parameters Į and ȕ.
5.2 The Growth Effect 
The Tanzi and Chalk model can be estimated and these estimates may be used 
in calculations of the total potential growth effect. Tanzi and Chalk estimated that 
debt lowers growth by a factor of 0.02, direct taxes lower growth by a factor of 0.08 
and public investment boosts growth by a factor of 0.25. Nevertheless, these elas-
ticities at least provide us with some crude estimates of the EU budget’s effect on 
the EU-wide economy. Kneller, Bleany and Gemmel (1999) estimated that “distor-
tionary taxes”
9 cut growth by a factor of 0.44, while non-distortionary taxes
10 made 
no impact. According to Kneller et al., productive investment increases growth by 
a factor of 0.27, i.e. very similarly as in the Tanzi-Chalk specification.  
To assess the growth impact of the EU budget we used the European Com-
mission analysis of allocation of expenditures and revenues by member state (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005). This allows us to distribute among all 25 EU member sta-
tes. Table 4 summarizes the payments of individual countries to the EU budget. 
The most important is the TOTAL column, which shows the total contribu-
tions of individual countries from various distorting tax sources. Table 4 illustrates 
that the highest share of national income (and thus the highest distortion) is borne by 
Belgium, which pays 1.34 % of its GNI to the budget. The lowest burden falls on 
the UK, due to its rebate. The ten new member states of the EU had been members 
for only eight months, so their contributions are proportionally lower. Three out of 
the four  countries  that  are  almost  completely  excluded  from  financing  the UK’s 
rebate – Germany, Austria and Sweden – also fare relatively well.
11
Table  5 s hows  the allocation  of  expenditures  by  member  state  for  various 
expenditure categories. In order to assess their impact on economic growth, we have 
to disentangle these categories into those that can be attributed to capital accumu-
lation – productive investment – and those that serve other purposes, mostly redis-
tributive. As argued above, we classified structural operations, spending on training 
and spending on research and development as “productive”. While education and 
training clearly do not contribute to physical capital, it can be argued that they in-
crease human capital and thus increase economic growth.
12
9 Defined in their paper as taxes on income and profit, social security contributions, payroll and labor taxes 
and taxes on property.  
10 All taxes on domestic goods and services.  
11 The fourth – the Netherlands – has its contributions boosted by the high customs duties that are collected
in its ports, even though the costs are borne by customers, mostly in Germany. 
12 See also Section 3 for a detailed discussion. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        317
FIGURE 4  Growth Effect of the EU Budget 2004 (% of GNI) 
Source: author’s calculations 










UK REBATE TOTAL 
Belgium  0.44 %  0.12 %  0.69 %  0.09 %  1.34 % 
Czech Republic  0.07 %  0.10 %  0.46 %  0.06 %  0.69 % 
Denmark  0.13 %  0.11 %  0.68 %  0.08 %  1.00 % 
Germany  0.11 %  0.12 %  0.68 %  0.02 %  0.93 % 
Estonia  0.09 %  0.09 %  0.44 %  0.06 %  0.68 % 
Greece  0.12 %  0.15 %  0.70 %  0.09 %  1.06 % 
Spain  0.12 %  0.15 %  0.70 %  0.09 %  1.06 % 
France  0.07 %  0.14 %  0.68 %  0.09 %  0.98 % 
Ireland  0.10 %  0.15 %  0.68 %  0.09 %  1.02 % 
Italy  0.09 %  0.15 %  0.69 %  0.09 %  1.02 % 
Cyprus  0.16 %  0.10 %  0.47 %  0.06 %  0.79 % 
Latvia  0.07 %  0.08 %  0.41 %  0.06 %  0.62 % 
Lithuania  0.08 %  0.09 %  0.45 %  0.06 %  0.68 % 
Luxembourg  0.06 %  0.16 %  0.72 %  0.09 %  1.03 % 
Hungary  0.07 %  0.10 %  0.47 %  0.06 %  0.70 % 
Malta 0.12 %  0.10 %  0.47 %  0.06 %  0.75 % 
Netherlands  0.30 %  0.14 %  0.69 %  0.01 %  1.14 % 
Austria  0.08 %  0.11 %  0.70 %  0.01 %  0.90 % 
Poland  0.06 %  0.10 %  0.68 %  0.09 %  0.93 % 
Portugal  0.09 %  0.14 %  0.69 %  0.09 %  1.01 % 
Slovenia  0.05 %  0.10 %  0.45 %  0.06 %  0.66 % 
Slovakia  0.06 %  0.09 %  0.46 %  0.06 %  0.67 % 
Finland  0.06 %  0.14 %  0.68 %  0.09 %  0.97 % 
Sweden  0.11 %  0.13 %  0.70 %  0.01 %  0.95 % 
UK 0.13 %  0.15 %  0.69 %  -0.30 %  0.67 % 
EU 0.12 %  0.14 %  0.68 %  0.00 %  0.94 % 
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The country that received most of this “productive” investment in 2004 was 
Portugal (2.7 % of its GNI), followed by Greece (1.8 % of GDI) and Spain (1.3 % of 
GNI). Among the new EU-10, the three Baltic countries benefited the most, but they 
still received only 0.5–0.6 % of their GNI in productive investment. Other countries 
received less than 1 % of GNI, the lowest beneficiaries being Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Cyprus, Slovenia and the UK, each of which received only 0.1–0.2 % of GNI 
in productive investment from the EU budget.  
We finally combine these two inputs – taxes paid and capital investments 
received – to calculate the total effect of the EU budget on economic growth in 
the EU-25. The results are summarized in Figure 4. Five countries of the old EU-15 
are estimated to gain a positive growth impulse from the EU budget: Portugal, Gree-
ce,  Spain,  Italy  and  Ireland.  The remaining  ten  countries  suffer  a negative  effect, 
ranging from a negligible number in Finland to a –0.06% effect for the Netherlands. 
Among the new EU-10, the three Baltic countries get a 0.1% boost due to EU budget 
transfers. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Malta are in the neu-
tral region: their performance is unchanged after the transfers. Slovenia and Cyprus 
may suffer a (very limited) setback to their growth rate. 
It should be repeated here that these effects account for only the direct bud-
getary effects of the European Union. We do not take into account the effects of 
stronger competition from within the single market, nor do we account for macro-
economic  policies  on  the EU  level.  On  the other  hand,  our  results  should  not  be 
dismissed out of hand. The annual boost of 0.6 % for the Portuguese economy adds 
6 % to the economy over a decade, a sizeable effect. Other “southern” countries – 
Greece and Spain and to some extent also Italy – also received a boost. 
However, if we take the European Union as a single entity, its growth poten-
tial is unaffected by its budget. In 2004 the EU-25 countries paid on average (GNI 
weighted) 0.9 % of GNI in taxes to the budget. They received, on the other hand, 
0.89 % of GNI from the EU budget, but only 0.38 % could be classified as “pro-
ductive investment” contributing to higher competitiveness of the EU economy (with 
all the caveats applied above). Thus, taken together, the EU budget may spur the EU’s 
growth by a statistically insignificant 0.023 % a year. It is fair to argue that such 
a miniscule effect is negligible and that there is probably no EU-wide economic ef-
fect from the EU budget.  
However, one remark is due in this context. If we applied the same methodo-
logy to any national budget of an EU member country, the effect would be much worse, 
as all countries devote a major part of their budgets to redistributive programs that 
would not qualify as “productive” in the Tanzi and Chalk methodology. 
6. The New Member States’ Position 
This chapter deals with the potential impact of the new financial perspective 
for the period 2007–2013 on the new member states (NMSs). The NMSs are all cer-
tain to remain net beneficiaries of the budget, but they will have to compete for funds 
not only with the current Objective 1 countries (Portugal, Greece, Spain), but with 
many other “phase-in” and “phase-out” regions. As Table 5 shows, the biggest bene-
ficiaries will be the three Baltic countries and Poland, which are expected to receive 
net transfers of around 4 % GNI annually. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Re-320                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
public should benefit to the tune of 3 % GNI annually, while Slovenia will receive 
the lowest transfers (between 1 % and 2 % of GNI). 
The crucial factor, however, is how the member countries use the funds trans-
ferred from the EU budget, i.e. whether they use them for “productive investment” in 
line with Tanzi and Chalk or whether they waste them by financing purely redis-
tributive programs. The old member countries differ to a large extent in their ability 
to channel EU funds towards more productive investment. By definition, countries 
receiving structural funds should enjoy higher productivity effects. Indeed, 80 % of 
EU funds spent in Portugal can be classified as “productive”. This share, though, 
falls to 60 % for Spain and to 42 % in another big recipient – Greece. As we illus-
trated, the new member states do not reach this high productivity level, as most of 
their transfers are “compensation” payments geared towards general budgets. Figure 5
shows that the new member states receive the bulk of their budgets from the com-
pensation programs. 
If we make the “reasonable” assumption that the NMSs, in the medium term, 
will not be as efficient as Portugal but they will increase their share of productive in-
vestment to some 50 % of total EU transfers, they may expect a boost to their growth 
rate of some 0.5 % for the Baltic countries and Poland, 0.4% for the three central Euro-
pean countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and 0.3 % for Slovenia. 
The impact of European Union membership is not, however, limited to bud-
getary transfers. Especially for the new members, EU membership is supposed to ac-
celerate their convergence with the higher income countries. As our estimates in 
the previous section suggest, EU membership (and the capital investment it brings) 
may increase a country’s growth rate. In this respect, it matters more whether the EU 
will complete the single market, improve its macroeconomic framework and boost 
investment in human capital than whether the new financial perspective will direct 
more or less capital investment to the NMSs. 
Nevertheless, the budget may support the NMSs’ convergence. In this respect, 
the new financial framework for 2007–2013 may play an important role in redirect-
ing funds from non-productive programs, such as the CAP, to a more pro-growth 
agenda. The Commission set a very ambitious goal of increasing investment in re-
search and development, which should reach € 80 billion over seven years. For this 
investment to be successful, however, a functioning system of EU-wide coordination 
must be set up in order to select the best projects and avoid duplications.  
FIGURE 5  Share of Productive Investment (% of total spending) 
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The new member states face a challenging dilemma in this respect. As they 
are to gain most from the EU acceleration, they should be supporting the reallocation 
of funds to research and development. Also, their agricultural lobbies are less orga-
nised and less “corrupted” by the CAP, so elimination of some CAP subsidies would 
face weaker opposition. Thus, the NMSs should join countries such as the UK and 
the Netherlands and accelerate the CAP reduction in order to make room for more 
productive investment. 
On  the other  hand,  the NMSs  would  most  probably  benefit  less  than  pro-
portionally from a reallocation. Their research and development capacities do not 
guarantee that they would qualify for a proportional part of the funds spent. More-
over, the NMSs tend to have proportionally larger agricultural sectors, so they stand 
to gain more from the (unreformed) CAP, once its most striking bias is eliminated. 
Thus, from this point of view, short-term budgetary logic should lead the NMSs to 
support France and the EU’s “Mediterranean wing”. 
The NMSs’ position on the UK’s rebate is much more straightforward: they 
stand to gain from the elimination of the UK’s rebate, even if it is substituted by 
the Commission’s proposal of a generalized correction mechanism (see Table 4). Thus, 
if the EU leaders opted for a grand “zero”, i.e. joint elimination of the rebate and 
substantial reduction in CAP spending, the new member states should celebrate.  
7. Conclusion 
The European Union finds itself in a fascinating period. The great push for 
more integration and enlargement in the 1990s has led to some fatigue within the EU. 
In response to this, the EU has set out to streamline its governance and to re-focus 
towards growth-friendly activities. The Union’s financial framework for the 2007– 
–2013 period reflects these conflicts. On the one hand, all the member countries are 
obsessed with limiting their net contributions to the budget. On the other hand, no 
country seems to be prepared to give up its own pet projects on the spending agenda. 
Add to this ten newcomers trying to muscle their way to funds from the EU and 
the mixture becomes very combustible. 
Nevertheless, even in this flux, the EU authorities and their masters in the na-
tional  governments  should  seek  an economically  efficient  framework  for  the new 
financial perspective spanning the period 2007–2013. Both the European Commis-
sion proposal and the Lisbon agenda provide some useful guiding principles. First, 
the EU budget should limit its non-productive spending, mostly on the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The CAP has been nudged towards yet another redistributive 
policy that is better run at the national level. For example, the 2004–2006 co-financ-
ing of EU budget transfers to farmers in the new member states represents a first 
attempt at introducing a national co-financing mechanism into the CAP and should 
be extended.  
Second, the European budget may increase its convergence role by concen-
trating  more  on  poor  member  states.  In  this  respect,  the dilution  of  the structural 
funds’ focus on poor member states, as envisaged in the new financial perspective, is 
counterproductive.  The EU  should  consider  moving  towards  a more g eneralized 
model  whereby  richer  countries  would  support  poorer  ones  through  a system  of 
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rent anomaly where the two richest member states – Luxembourg and Ireland – are 
also the biggest net recipients of EU funds. 
Last, but perhaps not least, the EU may play a useful catalytic role in financ-
ing some areas with potential economies of scale or high public good or externality 
effects. These may include research and development (including international train-
ing and education, where Erasmus is planned to take 40 % of the education budget, 
i.e.  € 14  billion)  and  infrastructure  programs.  The new  member  states  may  play 
a useful role in the EU budget negotiations if they help to bring about a substantial 
change in the budget. The EU budget as it is now represents a neutral factor for most 
countries and it will accelerate the new member states’ economies only marginally. 
Given the attention, effort and time given to the budget, it is not good value for their 
money. 
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Editorial Note 
The editors and the office of the “Czech Journal of Economics and Finance- 
-Finance a uver” would like to express sincere regret to our readers for attributing 
the paper “Cohesion Policy, the Convergence Process and Employment in the Eu-
ropean Union”, published in the 2007/3-4 issue on pages 126–141, to Boris Gramc. 
The paper was, in fact, written by Sandy Dall’erba from the University of Arizona 
(USA) and Julie Le Gallo from the Université de Franche-Comté (France) and it 
was submitted to our journal by Professor Gramc without their knowledge or con-
sent. Professors Dall’erba and Le Gallo have graciously agreed to publish their 
paper in our journal and we are printing an updated version in this issue of the jour-
nal under their names, titled as “The Impact of EU Regional Support on Growth and 
Employment”. 
We sincerely apologize to both authors and ask our readers to ignore the ver-
sion published under the improper title and credits. We also ask libraries and elec-
tronic databases to delete the paper “Cohesion Policy, the Convergence Process and 
Employment in the European Union” published on pages 126-141 from the list of 
papers published in 2007. 